substances are mistakenly understood as things in themselves rather than ‘mere representations of the thinking subject’ (A392). Kant’s critical attitude towards attempts (including prior ones of his own) to resolve mind–body interaction through an account of immediate influence is that they founder on the assumption that the topic is one that is properly answerable within a metaphysical programme, whereas the transcendental idealist can provide the explanatory grounds for human beings’ ultimate inability to provide an accurate resolution (A393). – JC

**Further Reading**


**PIETISM**

Pietism was a religious Protestant movement within the Lutheran Church in early and mid-eighteenth century Germany, which reacted against Lutheran orthodoxy, doctrinal as well as ecclesiastical, and which gave rise to an eminently individualist and inward approach to the Christian faith.

One of the main sources of inspiration of Pietism was Philipp Jakob Spener’s *Pia desideria*, published in 1675, in which among other things Spener argued for earnest Bible study in small groups, the so called *ecclesiolae in ecclesia*, for universal priesthood (participation of the laity in the religious service), thus displaying radical social egalitarianism, for the necessity of practical Christian life, and most importantly, for sermons to be a source of inspiration, instilling devotion in the inner soul of the Christian, rather than merely being a display of rhetorical accomplishment.

By nature, Pietism was a very diverse movement. One of its more extremely enthusiastic and even psycho-erotic variants was the *Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine*, founded by Nikolaus Ludwig Graf von Zinzendorf (1700–1760) in 1722. But in whatever form it always manifested, to a greater or lesser extent, an undercurrent of exaltation, mysticism and not uncommonly, theosophy and even occultism. A chief characteristic of Pietism, however, is the emphasis on personal experience. Individual ‘conversion’ and ‘awakening’ marked out these so-called *Kernchristen*, who congregated in small local groups notwithstanding the fact that, beyond their immediate environment, they felt a universal bond with like-minded fellow truly born-again Christians, the spiritual community of God’s elect, which manifested Pietism’s strongly anti-institutional ecumenical nature. Other distinguishing features of Pietism, in which it strikingly differed from mainstream Lutheranism, was a certain amount of chiliasm, the almost exclusive focus on Christology, and a *Blut und Wundentheologie* that opposed the perceived seventeenth-century quietistic distortions of the reformational doctrine of justification, and insisted on the supernatural effusion of the divine life within the soul of the believer, thus bringing about a rebirth.

In general – forming the backdrop of Pietism – the eighteenth-century religious person sought to humanize the transcendence of God, to subjectivize that which is outside him and historically distant (e.g. Christ’s death and resurrection), implying an emphasis on
the centrality of the present, the concrete and the personal (‘one’s inner voice’), but also that he only recognized his fellow human being insofar as he would recognize himself in the other. All experience and knowledge of transcendent authority, all things heteronomous or external, he considered in terms of an experience of something that is only relatively distinct from the human being, and so must have a place within the purview of the inner authority of the human being, to which God speaks directly. This meant the inclusion of God in the context of sovereign human self-consciousness and conscience, and the sublation of transcendence into what is experienced internally or purely inwardly.

Individuality and inwardness thus become central tenets of what it means to be a human being in general. In this respect, Pietism is intimately connected to the emergence of the Enlightenment in Germany. The development of Pietism must also be seen against the background of the growing power of the absolute state and the secular subjugation of the Church, or at least the more hierarchical-bureaucratic aspects of the Church, e.g. the appointment of clergymen (caesaropapism), while allowing the co-existence of various religious denominations and leaving the content of one’s beliefs to each individual’s own conscience. Also the growing centrality of the middle class and its sense of morality, and not least the increasing status of science and philosophy, played a significant role in the emergence of the individualism of which Pietism is a clear religious manifestation.

The bourgeoisification and moralization of the Christian religion meant that faith came to be regarded as something that must contribute to an inwardly experienceable, but no less outwardly concretely observable change in the way one conducts one’s own life, the praxis pietatis. Christian faith was foremost concerned with the way one gives shape to, and improves, one’s life, in the here and now. This expressed the general wish to distance oneself from all too theoretical or intellectualist approaches to being a Christian, which, as evidenced in previous ages, resulted all too often in strife and destructive fervour among Christians. The Christian bourgeois of the eighteenth century opposed orthodox theological theory as unfruitful, if not dangerous. Mere Christian doctrine does not amount to Christian faith, without it having relevance for one’s own life, without it satisfying one’s own personal needs. True faith means changing one’s life in accord with doctrine, not adhering to doctrine for the sake of it. It is therefore not just critical of all the dialectical subtleties of theological erudition, but it also amounts to a positive demand for a practical employment of Christian creeds. This, however, often led to a moralistic, even utilitarian hollowing out of those creeds.

The relation in the academic as well as public arena between the Pietists and the Wolffians (rationalists) (→ Königsberg) was often strained, and although they had very different outlooks on life and society, this does not mean that they were always, in all respects, working in opposite directions. Both were oriented to changing life practically, focusing on improving one’s life by virtue of good works that necessarily ensued from faith, but the Pietists took care more of the inward good works, whereas the rationalist provided more for the outward ones. They were in unison, however, against any form of Christian quietism (though Pietists were sometimes themselves accused of this).

Furthermore, the Pietists felt only relatively bound by the letter of the Bible and theological doctrine, namely only to the extent that they were morally edifying. The moral principle of leading a good life was
paramount in all one’s religious activities. Every aspect of one’s faith revolved around the idea of a natural, rational Christianity, which was opposed not to revelation or even mysticism and exaltation (they were considered perfectly compatible with a rationally interpreted Christian faith), but to failing to develop the human being, failing to subject one’s creeds to the will and agency, and needs, of the individual, of oneself. For the eighteenth-century individual, nature was the totality of objects that were at the disposal of the will, feeling, and mind of the individual. For the Pietist, rational Christianity likewise means a Christianity that is in accord with the power of, and affirmed by, the human being himself, who regards the Christian creeds in terms of his own religious needs.

The main centre of Pietism in Prussia was the University of Halle, where A. H. Francke (1663–1727) propagated Pietistic ideas. It was from here that Pietism spread throughout Prussia. The political importance of Pietism increased when Frederick William I began relying on Pietists for his socio-political reforms in opposition to the conservative forces in Prussia, which were allied to the more orthodox elements within Lutheranism. Francke was a fervent social activist. The Hallean, that is, Franckeian, variant of Pietism had a huge impact in Königsberg. The Collegium Fridericianum, attended by the young Kant, was first founded as a collegium pietatis by Theodor Gehr in the spirit of the Halle Anstalten. An important figure in the intellectual and cultural life of Königsberg, and from whom Kant received his ‘earliest religious instruction’, was F. A. Schultz, who was behind the attempt to reconcile Pietism and Wolffianism, which was effectively banned in Königsberg between 1723 and 1740. One of Kant’s teachers, Martin Knutzen (1713–1751), himself a Pietist and defender of the theory of physical influx, was a student of Schultz.

Among Kant scholars, Kant is often portrayed as straightforwardly hostile to Pietism as he was to religious popular culture, religious ceremony, or ecclesiastical authority in general. True, he denounced the often ‘slavish cast of mind’ (R 184–185n.) of the Pietists, and their enthusiasm in their ‘fantastic’ belief of the possibility of experiencing the supersensible in terms of the supernatural as the cause of one’s empirical mystical experience (R 174; cf. CF 33, 57n.). Nevertheless, as Allen Wood rightly observes, ‘much in Kant’s conception of true morality and religion amounts to a rationally purified version of Pietism’. It is thus not too fanciful to argue that the central tenet of Pietism, the emphasis on moral autonomy and individuality, as well as the centrality in Pietism of morality and moral life conduct, appears to have left an imprint on the young Kant so much so that, in some more rational form, it influenced his mature theory of morality. – DS

**Further Reading**


**PRUSSIA**

In 1525, the Protestant Albrecht I of Brandenburg-Ansbach (1490–1568) united the remaining territories of the Deutschtordensstaat into the Duchy (Herzogtum) of Prussia. This Duchy was not recognized by the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of which, as a consequence, it would never form a part.